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ABSTRACT: Light metaphors occurring in Chinese philosophy and Stoicism are of special 
interest for the unique ways they channel potentialities of the self. In this paper I apply ideas 
from cognitive linguistics to examine selected structural features of these metaphors. I also 
build on these ideas by presenting a framework regarding affects to assist in disclosing what 
is at stake for differing Chinese and Stoic technologies of the self. The paper adopts a high-
level perspective to see these broad philosophical implications, interleaving discussions of 
Chinese philosophy (mainly views associated with Daoism), Stoicism (bringing into relief 
important differences from these views), and contemporary research on socially constructed 
affects. This “triadic” comparative approach aims to shed new light on some root 
assumptions built into the projects of self-cultivation that are at the core of Chinese and Stoic 
worldviews. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Light metaphors occurring in various philosophical and religious traditions are often 
tied to forms of self-cultivation.  Light metaphors occurring in Chinese philosophy 
and Stoicism in particular are of special interest for the unique ways they channel 
potentialities of the self. In this paper I apply ideas from cognitive linguistics, 
primarily from the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, to examine selected 
structural features of these metaphors. Since these metaphors occur in a wider social 
and normative context, I similarly step back and present a framework regarding 
affects to assist in disclosing what is at stake for differing Chinese and Stoic 
technologies of the self. The paper adopts a high-level perspective to see these broad 
philosophical implications, interleaving discussions of Chinese philosophy (mainly 
views associated with Daoism), Stoicism (bringing into relief important differences 
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from these views), and contemporary research on socially constructed affects.  This 
“triadic” comparative approach aims to shed new light on some root assumptions 
built into the projects of self-cultivation that are at the core of Chinese and Stoic 
worldviews. 
 
2.  IMAGE SCHEMAS AND METAPHOR 
 
One of the most important claims from the work being done on metaphor in cognitive 
linguistics is that metaphor is not just a linguistic figure; it is primordially an 
embodied mode by which we think. I think this insight resonates with Chinese 
philosophy, given Chinese philosophy’s widespread use of metaphor and the 
importance placed on (embodied) contextual particularities. This section covers 
selected ideas from cognitive linguistics that will be used to excavate features of 
metaphors pertaining to xin (“heart-mind”) and light. 
To begin, metaphor and embodiment are linked through what is termed an “image 
schema,” which Johnson characterizes as “a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity 
in, or of, those ongoing ordering activities….  [It consists of a] small number of parts 
and relations, by virtue of which it can structure indefinitely many perceptions, 
[concrete] images, and events” (Johnson 1987, 29). It is crucial to note that image 
schemas are embodied at a preconceptual level, and provide structure to many of our 
higher-order modes of cognition, including linguistic expressions of metaphor, simile, 
and so forth.  Image schemas have two important features: they are nonpropositional 
(in the sense of being rooted in perceptual-sensorimotor processes), and they have a 
figurative embodied character.  As Johnson writes: 
 
Because of the limitations of our propositional modes of representation, we have a hard 
time trying to express the full meaning of our experiences.  To cite a simple example, my 
present sense of being balanced upright in space at this moment is surely a 
nonpropositional awareness that I have, even though all my efforts to communicate its 
reality to you will involve propositional structures (Johnson 1987, 4). 
 
In addition to being nonpropositional and figurative, image schemas are experiential 
gestalts/patterns rooted in perceptual-sensorimotor processes that are broadly 
coincident with Deweyan habits (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 97). Thus while image 
schemas are historically indebted to Kantian schemata, they are actually a part of a 
research program that empirically investigates these non-transcendental, transactive 
habit-patterns (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 80-81; see also Hampe 2005). 
The figurative embodied character of image schemas is closely tied to the 
formation of metaphor, whether in its narrow linguistic form or more widely as a 
cognitive structure.  In general, image schemas dynamically support and enable a 
number of important embodied structures in addition to metaphor, such as metonymy, 
radial categories, and so on (Lakoff 1987).  Since in this paper I focus on metaphor, 
image schemas make possible what Johnson calls “metaphorical projections,” which 
57 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 5.1 (2014)  TAKAKI 
extend an image “schema from the physical to the nonphysical” (Johnson 1987, 34).1  
To illustrate, the expression “tell me your story again, but leave out the minor details” 
projects the physically based CONTAINER image schema, which arises from embodied 
processes such as using a cup, or being a physically bounded organism with “inner 
stuff,” to the telling of a story (Johnson 1987, 34).2 The CONTAINER schema allows 
for conceptualizing the telling of a story, which is strictly speaking a nonphysical 
conceptual entity, in terms of this container. The view of metaphor that Lakoff and 
Johnson argue for treats “metaphor as a matter of projections and mappings across 
different domains in the actual structuring of our experience (and not just in our 
reflection on already existing structures)” (Johnson 1987, 74). 
 These mappings can take on various forms; for example, Lakoff and Johnson 
spend a fair amount of time discussing what they call “conventional metaphors,” 
under which fall “orientational,” “ontological,” and “structural” metaphors. Very 
briefly, structural metaphors are metaphors that structure one concept in terms of 
another (usually through highlighting); orientational metaphors organize “a whole 
system of concepts with respect to one another” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 14); and 
ontological metaphors provide “ways of viewing events, actions, emotions, ideas, 
etc., as entities and substances” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 25). Lakoff and Johnson 
argue more broadly that new concepts are often grounded in conventional metaphors.  
Thus one virtue of their view is that it accounts for not only how dead metaphors 
work—entrenched metaphors that are sometimes mistaken for literal or propositional 
modes of thought—but also how new metaphors are formed from dead metaphors.  
To reemphasize, metaphor, as an experiential and embodied structure, is not merely a 
linguistic figure; this is only one of its manifestations. Thus in general, “the essence 
of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 5). For Lakoff and Johnson, “human thought processes 
are largely metaphorical” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 6); the main function that 
metaphor serves is to structure our ideas by the mapping of select information from 
one domain to another.
3
 
                                                 
1
 For Lakoff and Johnson, nonpropositional image schemas structure a significant region of our 
cognition that is classified as metaphorical. Metaphor, as an embodied cognitive structure, is a 
mapping from a source domain to a target domain, where the two domains are often quite different yet 
share certain salient features brought to the fore by the mapping; it is the systematic nature of the 
embodied mapping that constitutes metaphor as a cognitive structure. Thus for Lakoff and Johnson’s 
research program, it is beside the point whether metaphor is propositional, picks out salient features 
from differing propositional domains, or is primarily a communicative tool. For such conceptions miss 
the underlying embodied aspect of metaphor that enables kinds of thinking, communicating, 
experiencing, and so forth. 
2
 By convention, image schemas and metaphors are signified by capitalization. 
3
 Lakoff and Johnson spend a fair amount of time covering various theories of metaphor and how their 
novel account is superior in marshalling empirical evidence from cognitive science. I think separate 
and convergent support for their views can be found in Antonio Damasio’s work (Damasio 1994, 
1999, 2003, 2011). Damasio similarly marshals neurobiological evidence in support of his view that 
our understanding of our external world and ourselves originates out of projected mappings of the 
body’s interior (compare Gibbs 2005). 
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 To use orientational metaphors as an illustration, an example of which will appear 
in section four, such metaphors do as the name suggests: they orient concepts. Lakoff 
and Johnson claim that most of our orientational metaphors are spatial in nature, since 
“we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical 
environment” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 14). Even stronger, many of our most 
fundamental concepts are spatial in nature and are organized through spatial 
metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 17). Each orientational metaphor has its own 
internal coherence that allows new experiences to conform to its structure.  There is 
also an external systematicity among spatialization metaphors, thus delineating a 
coherence among metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 18). For example, the 
metaphor “GOOD IS UP gives an UP orientation to general well-being [which indicates 
internal coherence], and this orientation is [also “externally”] coherent with special 
cases [of other metaphors] like HAPPY IS UP, HEALTH IS UP, ALIVE IS UP, CONTROL IS 
UP” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 18). Orientational metaphors, and metaphors in 
general, also crucially interact with social and cultural factors that differ from culture 
to culture, although certain basic physical metaphors are found throughout all 
cultures.  However, as Lakoff and Johnson note, it is “hard to distinguish the physical 
from the cultural basis of a metaphor, since the choice of one physical basis from 
among many possible ones has to do with cultural coherence” (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980, 19). 
 Such coherence (internal, external, and cultural) intimately relates to the 
generation of new metaphors.  Structural metaphors in particular are a fruitful source 
for new metaphors, since the general categories they establish “allow us to do much 
more than just orient concepts, refer to them, quantify them, etc., as we do with 
simple orientational and ontological metaphors; they allow us, in addition, to use one 
highly structured and clearly delineated concept to structure another” (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 61). Although orientational and ontological metaphors also can be 
extended so that new, emergent metaphors and concepts can arise, structural 
metaphors have much more traction in the formation of new concepts. It is important 
to note that all three types of metaphor share the same grounding: the systematic 
correlations in our experience (which fundamentally are based in our bodily 
interactions) (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 61). These systematic correlations form 
image schemas that in turn form categories and subcategories. Subcategorization, for 
example, occurs when an activity is of the same kind of activity that is involved in the 
formation of the relevant category, and also shares “enough of the same structural 
features” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 84). Metaphors, by contrast, show a “difference 
in kind of activity, and partial structuring” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 84). The point 
is that both metaphor and subcategorization have the same grounding, and are 
“endpoints on a continuum” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 85). New concept formation 
is thus like a plastic material in that metaphor stretches the surface outwards and into 
different forms, while subcategorization tends to contract the surface back into its 
“natural” resting shape.  New concept formation occurs along this continuum, where 
metaphor and subcategorization interact. This continuum is directed from 
subcategorization to metaphor (from resting shape to stretched surface, as it were), 
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and is made possible by the formation of categories, or experiential gestalts, which 
are “multidimensional structural wholes.  Structuring our experience in terms of such 
multidimensional gestalts is what makes our experience coherent” (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980, 81). Thus metaphorical coherence is based on the coherence that arises 
from the formation of categories, which in turn emerges from bodily, physical, and 
cultural interactions. 
 There are several important points about metaphorical coherence. The first is that 
metaphors have “entailments” (as Lakoff and Johnson call them), which are the 
various senses in which a metaphor can be unpacked. For example, in the metaphor 
“an argument is a journey,” since a journey defines a path, an entailment would be 
“an argument defines a path” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 91; see chapter 16 for more).  
Entailments “play an essential role in linking all of the instances of a single 
metaphorical structuring of a concept” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 96). Secondly, 
metaphorical entailments “play an essential role in linking two different metaphorical 
structurings of a single concept” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 96). This allows for 
cross-metaphorical connections to be established, and potentially new conceptual 
hybrids to be generated from these cross-connections. Thus new metaphors can define 
new concepts that have real cultural currency. And as they are entrenched in usage, 
perhaps in time becoming dead metaphors, this starts anew the ebb and flow of novel 
concept formation based on established materials. In brief, it appears there is an 
irreducible threefold interaction between image schemas, embodied mechanisms like 
metaphor (as well as a host of other mechanisms that cognitive linguistics explores), 
and background cultural/philosophical assumptions. 
How does all this bear on Chinese philosophy?  As it pertains to one of the 
central ideas in Chinese thought, xin, there are a host of linguistic metaphors 
deployed in various contexts that aim at human cultivation.  Embodied structures like 
metaphor enact worldviews often by way of linguistic vehicles. The resources from 
cognitive linguistics further allow for an examination of metaphoric structures 
illuminating, beyond their mere linguistic form, how we conceive, feel, interact, and 
so forth. This view of metaphor and image schemas I think strongly resonates with 
Chinese philosophy; it will also be used to disclose how radically different certain 
Daoist notions are when compared with some deeply entrenched assumptions in 
western philosophy.
4
 
 
                                                 
4
 For similar explorations, see Slingerland 2003, 2004, and 2011; and Chong 2006.  Edward 
Slingerland (2011), for example, argues that research in cognitive science indicates that metaphoric 
thinking is more fundamental and widespread than previously thought, challenging a standard view 
that western ways of thinking are “analytical” (not metaphor-based) and fundamentally different from 
eastern ways of figurative and metaphorical thinking. While I am generally sympathetic to 
Slingerland’s claims, firstly it ought to be kept in mind that cognitive linguistics is one research 
program among other (at times competing) research programs. And secondly, in spite of my general 
agreement with Slingerland, I shall argue for a middle ground: while eastern ways of thinking are more 
attuned to the omnipresence of metaphoric thought, incommensurabilities between worldviews emerge 
via the (differential) threefold interaction of image schemas, metaphors, and background philosophical 
assumptions. 
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3.  LIGHT METAPHORS AND XIN 
 
A central image schema operating tacitly across philosophical traditions is the 
CONTAINER schema. Aristotle, for example, uses container metaphors for 
conceptualizing place as well as for classifying statements regarding predications that 
can be made of a subject.
5
 The Aristotelian use of container metaphors is informed by 
specific metaphysical aims and background projects (for instance, providing an 
epistemically satisfactory account of the nature of things). However, as alluded to 
above, it is important to distinguish the linguistic use of such metaphors from the 
embodied, nonpropositional CONTAINER image schema. This becomes especially 
apparent regarding its employment in Chinese philosophy and the metaphors 
associated with xin that Ning Yu (1998, 2009) extensively maps from a cognitive 
linguistics perspective. In this section I briefly cover a few of Yu’s ideas, and also 
some of Edward Slingerland’s similar analysis, as they relate to xin and light 
metaphors occurring in Chinese philosophy, specifically those that have associations 
with Daoism. 
 One metaphor that Yu analyzes which links xin and light is the HEART AS LIGHT 
SOURCE metaphor: “The changes of the light source will change the visual perception 
of the things in the light of this light source” (Yu 2009, 55). What is interesting is the 
bridging role that “‘spiritual light’ (shen-ming)” plays in relating xin to nature: such 
light “refers to the totality of the spiritual and mental aspects of a person…[; it 
accounts for] the unity and correspondence between nature and man” (Yu 2009, 56).  
In other words, xin stands for the totality of a person’s being, which if properly 
channeled expresses harmonization between person and nature. The scope and degree 
of clarity of one’s field of awareness indicates the degree of harmony achieved; thus 
an “unenlightened” heart’s field of awareness is dull and narrow, lacking proper 
channeling, whereas a sage’s awareness shines with wide clarity.6 
 An association of the HEART AS LIGHT SOURCE metaphor further relating xin to 
nature is that the heart is like water, which can “reflect things only when it is still and 
                                                 
5
 In section eight I discuss some of the ways in which, despite shared image schemas, Aristotelian 
ideas diverge from eastern ways of conceptualizing relationality. 
6
 It should be noted that the HEART AS LIGHT SOURCE metaphor is especially prominent in Xun Zi’s 
writings; as a result one might inquire about the extent to which this metaphor is Daoist. Indeed, Erin 
Cline, in her piece on mirror metaphors, notes that 
Xunzi seems to be more concerned with emphasizing clarity than Zhuangzi, who focuses more 
heavily on stillness. For Zhuangzi and the early Daoists more generally, getting in touch with 
one’s spontaneous, pre-reflective intuitions means settling down and being at ease in the world. 
Zhuangzi’s goal, then, is to make the heart-mind still. For Xunzi, settling down in the Zhuangzian 
sense could only perpetuate the unrefined state into which we are born. Xunzi thinks we need to 
work hard at being attentive in order to refine ourselves. The work that it takes to hold a pan of 
water perfectly straight without even the slightest tilt is another metaphor for his rigorous program 
of self-cultivation. Xunzi’s goal is to make the mind clear so that it is ready to learn (Cline 2008, 
342). 
As I shall suggest in this section, I think there is a way to finesse these issues by viewing matters from 
the standpoint of an irreducible threefold interaction between image schemas, metaphor, and 
philosophical/cultural assumptions. 
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clear” (Yu 2009, 60).  Here the link to Daoism is salient since an “emptying” of xin 
allows for the reflection of things as they truly are, signifying one’s degree of 
awareness. Somewhat paradoxically, it is the occluding of ego that then allows for the 
illumination of various foci of one’s ever widening field of awareness. But what 
exactly is being emptied? Concentrating on the linguistic features of metaphor can 
obscure the deeply embodied preconceptual CONTAINER schema at work, an image 
schema that enables and affectively charges the very worldviews being configured by 
the HEART AS LIGHT SOURCE metaphor.
7
 It is important to keep in mind that schemas 
like these tacitly operate in the background, making possible the relevant linguistic 
figures and poetic gestures. To clarify how the CONTAINER schema meshes with the 
HEART AS LIGHT SOURCE metaphor, I shall briefly discuss some insightful objections 
to Slingerland’s similar analysis. 
 Also applying tools from cognitive linguistics, Slingerland likewise maps a 
schematic metaphor at work in Zhuang Zi’s writings, the SELF AS CONTAINER 
metaphor, which is linked to (linguistic) mirror metaphors that together express the 
notion of emptying-out and stillness. Arguing against Slingerland, Erin Cline claims 
that one 
 
problem with this analysis is that the idea of a mirror being empty (free of defilements) 
and the idea of a container being empty (having nothing in it) are significantly different, 
making the supposed connection between the mirror metaphor and the “self as container” 
metaphor schema appear to be rather thin (Cline 2008, 350). 
 
She also claims that there are two differing metaphor schemes at work in Zhuang Zi’s 
and Xun Zi’s uses of mirror metaphors. For apparently Xun Zi places emphasis on the 
HEART AS LIGHT SOURCE metaphor scheme (as linked to mirror metaphors) and not the 
SELF AS CONTAINER metaphor.  However I suggest that these important objections 
might actually be conscripted to strengthen Slingerland’s approach. Using Lakoff and 
Johnson’s ideas, one could argue that assuming Zhuang Zi and Xun Zi are in fact 
employing the same general “blended” metaphor scheme, they could be drawing 
attention to differing “metaphorical entailments” due to differing assumptions that 
together generate their respective differing worldviews.
8
 
  More precisely, this blend and its entailments are configured by the (irreducible) 
threefold interaction of image schemas, metaphors, and background philosophical 
/cultural assumptions.  Recall that an image schema is a recurrent pattern of ongoing 
                                                 
7
 Although similar metaphors are employed in Confucianism and Buddhism, a key difference is in the 
way Daoism emphasizes emptying-out, gesturing back towards our preconceptual, embodied modes of 
being-in-the-world.  For example, Hans-Georg Moeller argues that “Confucians take enormous efforts 
to cultivate their emotions…[whereas the] Daoists try to eliminate [empty-out] emotions from the heart 
of the sage” (Moeller 2004, p.119). And for Buddhism in general there seems to be a greater emphasis 
on “mind and its ‘spirituality’” (Moeller 2004, 150) in comparison to Daoism’s emphasis on the body. 
8
 Cline argues that Slingerland’s analysis only captures certain aspects of metaphoric meaning, and that 
what matters more are the cultural/philosophical contexts in which the metaphors occur (Cline 2008, 
352). Note that this is not a problem from the standpoint of the threefold interaction, which 
accommodates Cline’s (as well as Slingerland’s) insights. 
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ordering activities that dynamically enables and supports various other structures.  
Firstly, the preconceptual CONTAINER schema (arising from embodied processes such 
as using a cup or being a physically bounded organism with “inner stuff”) enables and 
supports the HEART AS CONTAINER metaphor, which in turn enables the ideas that the 
heart can be emptied and that the Way (Dao) can subsequently enter. Secondly, Yu, 
who offers a more detailed analysis than Slingerland, argues that the HEART AS 
CONTAINER metaphor (or equivalently Slingerland’s SELF AS CONTAINER metaphor) is 
blended with the HEART AS (LIGHT) SOURCE metaphor. Yu observes that as “a 
container, the heart has ‘precious treasures’ stored or hidden in it…[which] are 
gleaming and glittering (i.e. ‘enlightening’) as well” (Yu 2009, 323). The container 
metaphor affords a dispositional view of one’s true nature. That is, the treasures 
stored are actually dispositions—“contained” potentialities—to act in certain 
spontaneous yet appropriate ways (compare Slingerland 2004 on the various wu 
forms). The blend with the HEART AS (LIGHT) SOURCE metaphor in turn affords the 
notion that a sage’s heart allows for light to be shed on things, in clear and tranquil 
fashion.
9
 Thus these metaphors are not merely linguistic devices for conveying the 
Daoist capacity to “see without seeing,” as it were; their visual-affective associations 
also engage the perceptual-sensorimotor aspect of image schemas, and most 
importantly engage the wider embodied phenomenological sensibility that one’s 
awareness is clear, emptied, and profoundly attuned. 
 This view of blending, situated by the threefold interaction, addresses Cline’s 
objections to Slingerland’s “thin” analysis of metaphor for Zhuang Zi and Xun Zi. 
For this view accommodates both Zhuang Zi’s insight that xin should be still, and 
Xun Zi’s insight that xin should be clear. The philosophical emphasis on emptying-
out for Zhuang Zi affectively expresses stillness (gesturing beyond the “prison-house” 
of language, as it were); and the emphasis on clarity for Xun Zi gestures towards the 
Confucian dimension of cultivation. Thus Zhuang Zi and Xun Zi harness the above 
blend in differing ways: their metaphorical entailments differ in tandem with their 
differing philosophical worldviews.
10
 Importantly, though, what both worldviews 
have in common is that they gesture to the overflowing phenomenological 
dimensions of skillful “knowing-how” that, like with Johnson’s earlier quoted 
example concerning standing upright, are nonpropositional and image-schematic, 
although in qualitatively profound ways. 
In general, if Chinese modes of thinking are more affective, co-relational, and 
metaphorical in comparison to western modes of thinking, it would be a reasonable 
hypothesis that Chinese philosophy is more attuned to our embodied modes of being-
in-the-world in no small part because these visual-affective and phenomenological 
                                                 
9
 For examples of emptying xin see Zhuang-Zi chapter 2 (Graham 1981, 87) and chapter 7 (98); and for 
xin as a light source see chapter 5 (77-8), chapter 7 (98), and chapter 13 (259).  
10
 In terms of the threefold interaction, we can interpret Cline as placing emphasis on the cultural 
/philosophical dimension, and Slingerland as placing emphasis on image schemas and metaphor (that 
together generate worldviews). As an aside, I think Harold Oshima (1983) can be interpreted as 
arguing for a middle ground between Cline and Slingerland which is compatible with the threefold 
interaction. 
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associations are brought forth by the very manner in which Chinese philosophy is 
done, specifically its attunement to the use of metaphor and poetic language. It is 
generally acknowledged that poetic language is a well-suited vehicle for gesturing 
towards embodied preconceptual experience, as well as for disclosing other sorts of 
embodied experience (conceptual, lived, or otherwise). Furthermore, western 
employments of similar visual metaphors, emphasizing, for example, the “light of 
reason,” do not draw attention to the emptiness of such attunement. Thus while 
western metaphors may highlight the illuminating features of reason, in Chinese 
philosophy the heart is the sun (underwritten by the HEART AS LIGHT SOURCE 
metaphor), expressing not only a coincident concern with clarity of seeing, but more 
profoundly an affective harmonization between microcosm and macrocosm.
11
 The 
“empty” nature of light in particular enables a link between xin and the cosmos for 
Daoist strains of Chinese philosophy. 
In sum, the blend of the HEART AS CONTAINER metaphor with the HEART AS 
SOURCE OF LIGHT metaphor together with image schemas and background 
philosophical assumptions engender a significant portion of Chinese (mainly Daoist) 
worldviews. In particular, background Daoist and Chinese assumptions concerning 
the various wu-forms and the harmonic interrelations between microcosm and 
macrocosm channel metaphorical entailments whose “surface grammar” in texts 
gestures to figurative and phenomenological forms of profound experience. As will 
be discussed later, while there is a similar notion of harmony in Stoicism, Stoicism 
does not require any “emptying-out” to achieve harmony. 
 
4.  A FRAMEWORK FOR AFFECTIVE PROCESSES PART 1:  
THE DIMENSIONAL APPROACH 
 
This section adopts a metaview of the previous material and starts to present a 
conceptual framework for accommodating the threefold interaction of image 
schemas, metaphors, and background Chinese assumptions. There are, to be sure, 
differing interpretive approaches to Chinese philosophy; however I shall try to 
bracket such issues and focus instead on presenting a model of affective processes 
that coheres with this threefold interaction. I hope to show that the framework sheds 
new light on Chinese and Stoic views of self-cultivation. The motivation for 
presenting the framework is simple: Chinese philosophy is often characterized as 
thoroughly affective in contrast to western ways of philosophizing; while this is 
generally accurate, it appears that no metalevel account of affectivity is offered as to 
                                                 
11
 Note that the metaphoric expression “the heart is the sun” would be an instance of what Lakoff and 
Johnson call a (higher-order) “conceptual” metaphor, a metaphor enabled by image schemas and 
blends with (what they call) “basic” metaphors (Slingerland’s notion of metaphor schemes appear to be 
higher-order conceptual metaphors under which fall a number of subsidiary metaphors, whether as 
cognitive structures or in linguistic textual form). See Yu (2009) for details concerning how this 
mapping works. Note further that while Chinese clarity (ming) is constituted by an affective 
harmonization, the clarity of (western views of) reason’s light tends to issue from reason’s disciplined 
separation from certain emotions.  These themes are discussed later in the paper. 
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why and how differing conceptions of affects enable these differing worldviews. For 
surely, from a cross-cultural perspective, although there are congruencies, there seem 
to be significantly differing conceptions of what affects are and what roles they play.  
Using the language of the previous sections, while there may be universally employed 
image schemas (and certain other structures that are part of Lakoff and Johnson’s 
research program), it seems the differential interactions of schemas, metaphors, and 
background philosophical assumptions induce significantly different worldviews.
12
 
With this in mind, I present a framework that forms the third pole of a “triadic” 
comparative engagement with Chinese and Stoic views of self-cultivation. 
There is a research program studying affects that mixes a social constructivist 
approach with what is called a “dimensional approach” (a mixture that I shall refer to 
simply as “constructivism”). Here and in the next few sections I outline this research 
program, indicating along the way its relevance to the previous material. In this 
section I concentrate on how the dimensional approach meshes with the social 
constructivist approach. The name essentially conveys how affects are modeled: there 
are dimensional axes representing the major parameters for classifying affective 
phenomena (for example, a positive-negative valence axis and an orthogonal intensity 
axis forming a two-dimensional space; affective processes are interpreted as varying 
continuously along these axes). While dimensional approaches employ differing 
numbers and types of axes, broadly speaking affective phenomena can be general (for 
example, moods, dispositions) or specific (anger, joy); can involve an object (the 
object of one’s concern) or not (a diffuse sense of well-being); and can be expressed 
as “bipolar pairs (happy-sad)” or not “(tension, outrage, terror, and agitation all seem 
without an exact opposite, or perhaps to share the same opposite of calmness)” 
(Russell and Lemay 2000, 495). These affective phenomena are framed by eight 
characteristics, five of which I quickly cover since they bear on constructivism and a 
comparative view of affects.
13
 
A first characteristic is that affect language exhibits fuzzy boundaries, which may 
issue from cultural language games whose terms, from a cross-cultural perspective, 
seem comparable and yet cannot be accommodated in a single scheme. For example, 
Yu (2009) discusses some key differences between xin and western conceptions of 
the relations between heart and mind. Fuzziness may also issue from terms that are 
linked together within one form of life by family resemblance relations, which would 
preclude precise boundaries for a family of affect-terms, as is nicely illustrated by the 
rich, overlapping semantic fields paronomastically associated with xin. Closely 
related is a second characteristic, typicality: prototypical examples anchor the graded 
                                                 
12
 Slingerland’s 2008 work explores consilient relations between the humanities and the sciences, 
discussing in much greater detail the issue of shared, species-specific features of cognition and their 
bearing on the humanities. The sensibility of my essay follows in this spirit, although it explores the 
ways in which differences can arise via shared resources. 
13
 Note that the eight characteristics cohere with Lakoff and Johnson’s research program. 
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extensions of a category.
14
 For example, relative to Chinese philosophy, the 
prototypical heart-is-the-locus-of-the-mind idea is the basis for blending the HEART AS 
CONTAINER metaphor with the HEART AS SOURCE OF LIGHT metaphor (as well as a host 
of associated metaphorical entailments). 
A third characteristic holds that for a range of terms, the terms be oriented with 
bipolar parameters; for example, parameters like positive-negative valence would be 
general enough to include particular bipolarities like happy-sad. Even for terms not 
easily given a bipolar representation (such as tension, outrage, terror, and agitation, as 
mentioned above), the task is still to examine the extent to which these terms have an 
opposite term (such as calmness). Parameters like intensity aim to capture this diffuse 
type of bipolarity (tension has high intensity, whereas calmness has low intensity). 
With respect to Chinese philosophy the bipolar parameters would be non-dualistically 
conceived, in accordance with yin-yang, and would express the dynamic nature of 
situated, qualitative achievements. 
Two other characteristics that make clear the dimensional approach’s tie to social 
construction are scripts and the relativity of categories. Briefly, a script is a 
mechanism through which an affective process acquires its cultural gilding, as it 
were.
15
 Such gilding, in turn, reveals the relativity of categories, as affect categories 
differ relative to historical periods, socio-cultural factors, etc. It is thus important not 
to reify the particular dimensional representation being employed, as one must be 
sensitive to a semantic field’s configuration of terms that are embedded in a particular 
social matrix. 
These characteristics of the dimensional approach are used to argue for the view 
that affects are socially constructed. Briefly, affects are viewed as constructed via 
what are called “appraisals” (or affect-appraisals) which utilize mechanisms like 
image schemas, metaphor, scripts, and so forth to generate affective phenomena 
cohering with the above characteristics and the resources offered by Lakoff and 
Johnson. In plain terms, an individual processes information in some context using 
such mechanisms, giving rise to an overall “appraisal” of a situation, such as anger as 
an affective judgment of a perceived insult. 
The upshot is that on constructivism’s research program, significant differences 
are revealed when cross-culturally comparing affective notions. For example, as Yu 
writes, the noted constructivist Anna Wierzbicka “points out [that] the ‘heart’ is seen 
in English as ‘the organ of emotions’ [and] is ‘perceived as more closely related to 
the body than either soul or mind’”. Yu goes on to observe that from a western 
perspective the heart “is not viewed as a seat of all emotions, but only of emotions 
that are seen as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’” (Yu 2009, 352). In this regard, western 
frameworks generally view affect-appraisals as judgments of “good” or “bad” things, 
such as responses to pleasure or pain (parameters that are modeled via the 
                                                 
14
 The typicality of a category draws from work in cognitive linguistics on prototypes and image 
schemas (recall also the earlier remarks about concept formation occurring on a continuum between 
subcategorization and metaphor). 
15
 More formally, a script is a “prototypical sequence of causally connected and temporally ordered 
events” (Russell and Lemay 2000, 496). 
66 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 5.1 (2014)  TAKAKI 
dimensional aspect of constructivism).
16
 The image schemas, metaphors, scripts, etc. 
that channel these appraisals rely on a socially constructed framework operating in 
the background. For in English, while we can say “‘his heart was full of joy, 
bitterness, or sadness,’” it is awkward to say “‘his heart was full of surprise, 
amazement, or interest’” (Yu 2009, 352). Affective states associated with xin can 
accommodate the latter sorts of appraisals, given the nondual nature of heart-and-
mind, but on western models—even interactionist models (“feeling and thinking work 
together”)—there are latent dualities that reveal themselves in what can and cannot 
readily be said.
17
 
From a western viewpoint it makes very little sense to say, for instance, that 
“anger injures the liver” or “joy injures the heart,” since both of these are intertwined 
with background cultural/philosophical assumptions about the nature of qi and how it 
is metaphorically conceptualized: qi “goes ‘up’ in anger, [is] ‘slow’ in joy, ‘deflated’ 
in sorrow, [etc.]” (Yu 2009, 128). While in general western “emotions,” a 
westernized term, no less, are evaluated as good or bad in accordance with the 
embodied metaphors GOOD IS UP and BAD IS DOWN (recall the earlier discussion of 
orientational metaphors; see also Kövecses 2000), the socially constructed metaphor 
system operating here is contextualized by different assumptions concerning the 
nature of qi: anger is up, but is not thereby classified as “good,” while its opposite, 
fear, is indeed “bad,” but not because “bad is down”. In other words, if we were to 
assume the same western metaphor system operating in Chinese philosophy, if sorrow 
were “bad,” joy would thereby be “good” (both of which accord with western usage); 
but actually here joy is “slow”. One reason for this difference is that the heart is not 
conceived as the seat of certain “emotions” (a westernized term, to reiterate) that are 
evaluable as good or bad. Instead, as I discuss below, xin appears to harness an image 
schema that undergirds a range of metaphors in Chinese philosophy, the 
(preconceptual) EQUILIBRIUM schema. I postulate it is the interleaving of this schema 
with various qi metaphors that gives rise to a network of associations like those 
above, which make little sense on western models. This leads us to the following 
section further considering constructivism and the light it sheds on contrasting models 
of self-cultivation. 
 
5.  A FRAMEWORK FOR AFFECTIVE PROCESSES PART 2: 
CONSTRUCTIVISM AND DYNAMIC NOMINALISM 
 
Constructivism places emphasis on the dynamic interaction of cultural forces and 
individual affect-appraisals; even stronger, cultural forces are viewed as social 
constructs that are inextricably intertwined with individual appraisals, making these 
constructs “transactionally real” entities—a view cohering with our (irreducible) 
                                                 
16
 For a neo-Stoic view of affects as appraisal-judgments, see Nussbaum 2001. 
17
 Yu (1998, 2009) presents ample evidence of this, especially with respect to the integral relations 
between the five-element schematism in Daoism, the unity of micro and macrocosm, and the concepts 
associated with Chinese medicine. 
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threefold interaction.
18
 Social constructs are also viewed as higher-order entities, but 
with two qualifications. First, they are parasitic on individual appraisals, so they are 
not self-standing entities. Second, constructivists still want to acknowledge that such 
higher-order entities are not just a collection of individual appraisals; they are in some 
sense genuinely “real”. 
Paul Griffiths, borrowing from Ian Hacking’s work (1995) on multiple personality 
syndrome, offers a plausible way to interpret the claims that affective social 
constructs are not self-standing and yet are more than just a collection of individual 
appraisals. He notes that things like “citizens, members of parliament, and licensed 
dog owners are social constructions while electrons, magnesium, and clades are not. 
The categories referred to in the first list are social constructions, whereas those 
referred to in the second list are not” (Griffiths 1997, 145). What makes each former 
category more than merely a collection of individuals is the idea of “dynamic 
nominalism,” which “differs from simple nominalism in that the members of a 
category do share something over and above the fact that they are members of that 
category.  However, the fact that the members have these shared properties reflects 
the existence [emphasis mine] of the category and the social practices in which it is 
embedded” (Griffiths 1997, 146). These practices are ways of being that reflect the 
commitments of practitioners. The “dynamic” element has to do with the genuine 
difference practice makes for its members. As applied to affects, socialized affects 
express categories that are constructed; the categories exist since they are parasitic on 
individual appraisals that in turn have shared properties by virtue of their shared 
practices. Yet constructed affects are not merely the enumeration of individuals-with-
appraisals (and so are not merely nominalistic); the characteristic that makes these 
constructs “real” is the dynamic aspect of adopting what they afford within a practice: 
they enact forms of life that make genuine differences for its practitioners and how 
they practice. As this pertains to Chinese philosophy, xin and its surrounding 
background assumptions, the five-element schematism in Daoism, etc., express 
categories that exist in that they enact ways of being that have genuine effects, in the 
practice of Chinese medicine, for instance. 
From our metalevel perspective, dynamic nominalism can be interpreted as a tool 
bringing into relief emergent features stemming from the threefold interaction of 
image schemas, metaphors, and Chinese assumptions.  In particular, given that xin is 
a core Chinese idea indicating the thoroughly integrated nature of “affective 
cognition” (compare Chong 2011), from this metalevel perspective xin is a socially 
constructed category, an instance of dynamic nominalism, whose network of 
associations (underwritten by the threefold interaction) affords and generates an 
overall “cadence” distinctive to Chinese philosophy. One core idea in this network is 
the notion of harmony (he). There is a similar notion in Stoicism (homologia), but it 
                                                 
18
 I should further point out that I am appropriating particular sort of weak social constructivism 
because of its coherence with the threefold interaction. That is, weak social constructivists generally 
hold that there are at least three intertwined levels for understanding social affects: the biological level 
(which accommodates insights coming from evolutionary psychology), the psychological level (which 
accommodates work coming from cognitive linguistics), and the cultural/social level. 
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is configured quite differently. I hypothesize that one important thing they both 
implicitly employ is the preconceptual BALANCE image schema that is fed into 
differing metaphoric and cultural systems, which then envision-and-enact harmony in 
quite distinct ways. 
According to Johnson, the BALANCE schema arises from “acts of balancing and 
through our experience of systemic processes and states within our bodies” (Johnson 
1987, 75). This image schema consists of a proportional “arrangement of forces 
around a point or axis” (Johnson 1987, 85), and is based on bodily experiences like 
maintaining an upright stance. The BALANCE schema is discernable in various 
metaphors in Daoist writings, which draw forth the aim of establishing a harmonious 
balance amidst transformation (e.g., chapters 16 and 55 in the Dao-De-Jing; chapters 
3, 12, and 13 in the Zhuang-Zi).  Furthermore, it appears that higher-order metaphors 
appealing to harmony and balance, metaphors harnessing the preconceptual BALANCE 
schema, actually gesture “back” to the preconceptual, embodied roots of this very 
schema.  Yu (1998, 2009) maps a number of the metaphors and image schemas at 
play in conveying this dynamic sense of harmonic-balance. For example, one 
metaphor that Yu discusses is the CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS metaphor, which is 
structured by the BALANCE schema (in addition to a series of other important image 
schemas). However the BALANCE schema by itself does not appear to be rich enough 
to support the diverse uses of higher-order metaphors present in Chinese philosophy.  
It seems an enriched schema, the preconceptual EQUILIBRIUM schema (which stems 
from the prototypical BALANCE schema), is being harnessed, as it better coheres with 
a Chinese sense of multimodal harmonic-balance. 
According to Johnson, the EQUILIBRIUM schema builds on the prototypical 
BALANCE schema, and “results from the continuous mapping of symmetrical force 
vectors meeting at a point onto a curved surface” (Johnson 1987, 86). In other words, 
whereas the prototypical BALANCE schema is conceived of “one-dimensionally,” with 
two forces counterbalancing along this dimension, the similarly preconceptual but 
richer EQUILIBRIUM schema accommodates multiple dimensions that dynamically and 
continually establish a “thicker” homeostatic balance. 19  Such a multi-dimensional 
balance I think offers a more natural fit with Daoism’s various wu-forms and their 
characterization as potent, overflowing forms of emptiness that gesture towards 
maximally skillful achievements effortlessly balancing a host of considerations. 
 By contrast, Stoic views of harmony—for example, of calming the mind to reveal 
one’s place in nature, encapsulated in the notion of amor fati—seem to primarily 
harness the BALANCE schema and not so much the EQUILIBIUM schema. To bring this 
                                                 
19
 Observe that jing, which can be rendered as “equilibrium,” is foregrounded by yin-yang; that is, 
(high-level, linguistic) metaphors relating to jing are situated by a wider background context (see, for 
example, chapters 16 and 26 in the Dao-De-Jing).  Given the high-level employments of jing, it still 
appears plausible that the preconceptual EQUILIBIUM schema is being harnessed by various Chinese 
metaphors.  It should also be noted that a Daoist dynamic equilibrium (obtained via an emptying-out) 
is an achievement gesturing back towards a preconceptual, embodied sense of (cosmic) experience.  So 
even if the preconceptual EQUILIBIUM schema is being harnessed, that isn’t equivalent to the achieved 
state of “sagely jing”. 
69 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 5.1 (2014)  TAKAKI 
into view, the next section sketches Stoic views of affects, which carry a residual 
duality that I think issues from a unique interaction of image schemas, metaphors, and 
background assumptions. My working hypothesis is that from the differential 
interactions of these three things emerge quite different overall philosophical 
sensibilities concerning self-cultivation and harmony, even if Stoicism and Chinese 
philosophy harness similar basic resources like the BALANCE schema. 
 
6.  STOIC VIEWS OF AFFECTS 
 
It is important to keep in mind that as with Daoism (and much of Chinese 
philosophy), Stoicism views philosophy as a way of life, a stark contrast to the tenor 
of modern western philosophy since Descartes. To the extent that any western 
philosophical tradition aims at bridging the gap between theory and practice, Stoicism 
is a prime candidate. Building on the previous sections, I think that what is at work 
are two differing socially constructed views of affects and the roles they play in self-
cultivation. Comparing the two worldviews reveals not just two similar yet quite 
different ways of life, but also assumptions running through these worldviews that 
appear to be philosophical at root. 
While Stoics are a diverse group, there are several common themes. One 
prominent feature is the privileging of reason as the key regulator of one’s 
dispositions. Stoics also emphasize reason’s place in nature and the smallness of our 
lives in relation to the cosmos. It is presupposed that the cosmos expresses a rational 
order within which all things have a function. To discern our function is to discern 
how we accord with this cosmic order, which requires appropriate judgment that then 
allows things to “shine” forth in the light of reason, in particular, the harmony 
(homologia) between one’s inner rational dispositions and the larger cosmic rational 
order.
20
 Stoic harmonization shows certain similarities to Chinese harmony (he) and 
its relations to Daoist notions of letting-be. However such shining doesn’t stem from 
any emptying-out; instead there seems to be present a reason-as-light-source 
metaphor. 
For example, Marcus Aurelius utilizes light metaphors in conveying how one 
ought to cultivate judgment:  “The soul as a sphere in equilibrium: Not grasping at 
things beyond it or retreating inward. Not fragmenting outward, not sinking back on 
itself, but ablaze with light and looking at the truth, without and within” (Aurelius 
1989, 11.2). While this may appear like it harnesses the (preconceptual) EQUILIBRIUM 
schema alluded to previously, it better fits with the implicit use of the BALANCE 
schema, as it emphasizes a one-dimensional balancing of competing forces to bring 
forth the “light of reason”. The dual poles of the balancing relation require cultivating 
one’s judgment to properly grasp matters that are neither “beyond” nor merely 
“inward”. Such judging also manifests a finely tuned attentiveness (prosoche) that is 
neither “fleeing [on the one hand, nor]…pursuing [on the other]” (Aurelius 1989, 
                                                 
20
 See for example Long and Sedley (1987), section 63. 
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11.11). In general, Stoic metaphors tend to emphasize these sorts of dyads between 
inner and outer, between micro-dispositions and a macro-cosmos. 
 Furthermore, attaining proper Stoic judgment issues in a “blazing” light of reason 
that is neither disembodied nor non-“emotional”. Stoic reason is affectively 
conceived, but it is situated by a latent (non-Cartesian) duality not present in Chinese 
uses of light metaphors and the roles of xin. Stoics make a distinction between 
pathological affects (pathe) and “good” or non-pathological affects (apatheiai).  
Blocking the bad affects and cultivating the latter bring forth the light of reason, 
which displays the above sort of “balance”.21 Furthermore, balance, light, and reason 
are intimately related to learning to love one’s fate in the cosmic order of things.  As 
Pierre Hadot writes: 
 
The Stoic’s fundamental attitude is the love of those realities in whose presence he is 
constantly placed by the [cosmos], which are intimately linked to him, and with which he 
somehow identifies himself: Harmonize yourself with the things to which you are linked 
by Destiny.  For the basis of reality is love…natural processes are, in the last analysis, 
processes of union and of love (Hadot 1998, 230-1). 
 
Amor fati is not flatly the love of fate; it is the Stoic expression of 
harmonizing/balancing one’s dispositions with the rational cosmos, the achieving of 
proper judgment via the cultivation of one’s apathetic affective processes. Learning to 
(apathetically) love fate liberates one from the “grasping self,” as it were, thus 
revealing one’s true shining self and its transitory place within the cosmos. 
 These notions appear broadly compatible with Chinese harmony. Interestingly, 
Hadot draws a number of parallels between Stoicism and Chinese philosophy (Hadot 
1989, 310-11): the development of metaphysical concerns that are geared toward 
moral cultivation; the mutual concern with harmonizing one’s micro-dispositions 
with the macro-cosmos; and the parallel recognition of our smallness of place in 
nature that is actually part of learning to maximize one’s being. In spite of a range of 
affinities, one crucial difference is that for the Stoics there doesn’t seem to be a 
harnessing of the EQUILIBRIUM schema, specifically, of its multimodal affordances 
that Daoism appears to channel.  For there is still a latent duality present in Stoic 
views stemming from how affects are characterized, where finding balance requires 
                                                 
21
 One under the control of pathological affects is viewed as unbalanced, in contrast to a Stoic sage 
whose “arrow” of reason (the light shining on things) is held in proper “tension” (Long and Sedley 
1987, 422). Such tension is a balance whose strength issues from following the consistent 
(harmonizing) direction that reason indicates.  Aurelius similarly writes: 
The sun appears to be poured…in every direction but not poured out.  For this pouring is 
extension, and so its beams are called rays from their being extended.  …The pouring and 
diffusion of the understanding then should be similar, in no way a pouring out, but an extension, 
and it should not rest forcibly or violently on obstacles that meet it nor yet fall down, but stand 
still and illuminate the object that receives it; for that which does not reflect it will rob itself of the 
light (8.57). 
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shunting off pathological affects.
22
 One noticeable difference is that whereas Daoist 
affectivity gestures towards the preconceptual embodied roots of being-in-the-world, 
Stoics recommend reining in certain affects.  Informally, social construction for the 
latter might be advertised as a humanist regimen for building an “inner citadel,” 
whereas construction for the former actually de-constructs in order to leave us with 
“spontaneous, effortless play”. We end up with two quite different versions of 
harmony, even if similar sorts of equanimity and “naturalness” emanate from a Stoic 
sage and a Daoist sage.  From a metalevel view, it appears that Stoic and Chinese-
Daoist systems end up differing in the interaction of image schemas, metaphors, and 
background assumptions because there is a fundamental difference how they conceive 
of affects.
23
 The last two sections unfold this claim. 
 
7.  SOCIAL SYNDROMES AND CONSTRUCTIVISM:  
CONTINUING TO UNCOVER ROOT ASSUMPTIONS 
 
Differences in Chinese and Stoic worldviews become especially clear regarding how 
affects are conceived. In contrast to the Stoic split between pathological affects and 
those that are not, Chinese views of xin emphasize channeling one’s dispositions by 
learning to balance multiple modalities (yin-yang). There is an antagonistic duality 
present in the former and an embracing of opposites in the latter. To further bring 
forth the differences that emerge at the level of (triadically) comparing worldviews, I 
begin by further cashing out constructivism. 
Recall that dynamical nominalism views affective constructs as real because they 
enact ways of being that make genuine differences for its practitioners and how they 
practice. According to Griffiths’s survey of affective research programs, a key idea of 
constructivism is the classification of certain culturally constructed affects as 
“syndromes”. Firstly, a syndrome is dynamically nominalistic because members of a 
practice interpret an affect as a “passion” (as that which is suffered), which enacts a 
mode of behavior interacting with individual appraisals. A good illustration of this 
general phenomenon is the (widely cited) syndrome of amok, exhibited in certain 
Southeast Asian societies (see Averill 1982 and Griffiths 1997). Triggered by a 
                                                 
22
 Pathological affects need to be blocked off, apparently channeling the force dynamic BLOCKAGE 
schema (recall the proper “tension” in which a sage holds things; I suspect that the BALANCE schema 
and BLOCKAGE schema are blended to convey how such proper tension is harmonious). By contrast, for 
Daoism those affective processes that result in blockage (e.g., the discussions of benevolence, ritual 
propriety, etc. in Zhuang-Zi) need to be unobstructed.  Balance for the former issues from a disciplined 
separation (“blocking off”), whereas equilibrium for the latter issues from emptying-out 
(“unblocking”) separations. 
23
 Note that if we assume there are certain universally shared image schemas (basic metaphors, etc.) as 
Slingerland (2008, 2011) argues, which I tend to agree with, that still leaves unexplored the interaction 
of schemas, metaphors, and background assumptions.  Furthermore, if my working hypothesis—that 
some of the incommensurabilities between Stoic and Chinese-Daoist worldviews issue in part from the 
differing ways that these worldviews channel the BALANCE and EQUILIBRIUM schemas, respectively— 
is not wholly correct, the framework I offer still presents a plausible outline of how 
incommensurabilities can emerge even with shared image schemas (etc.). 
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socially perceived dishonor (for example, a victim of an affair; the inability to provide 
for family; etc.), a male “runs amok” by attacking others with varying degrees of 
violence. The behavior is socially interpreted as a disclaimed action (similar to a 
momentary insanity plea) and others briefly tolerate such violence, but the affair 
usually ends with group members killing the male. The sense in which running amok 
is a passion has to do both with the fact that the man is not pretending to be in a 
frenzy (amok is genuinely suffered by that person), and because it is also interpreted 
as a disclaimed action by others—amok requires the mutualism of being affected by 
circumstances and acting in response to being so affected.
24
 Secondly, the sense in 
which amok is a constructed syndrome has to do with the recognition that the man 
who runs amok “would not be in a [genuinely suffered] frenzy unless he had learned 
that this is an appropriate response to certain unbearable social pressures” (Griffiths 
1997, 141). The syndrome affords a new mode of behavior since the practitioners 
tacitly adopt the interpretation; this “meme,” as it were, spreads insidiously through a 
cultural matrix. Thus amok, from a higher-order perspective, is both a form of display 
(at the group level), and a felt state (at the individual level). It is an enacted mode of 
activation tapping into two systems, a cultural-level system and an individual 
appraisal system, jointly required for understanding the dynamical nature of affective 
syndromes. 
The emphasis on tacit interpretation is crucial, since it makes certain socially 
constructed affects (like amok) “covert” constructions. They are not overt, because if 
the community of practitioners and the person running amok were to realize that it is 
merely an interpretation of a passion as a disclaimed action, the practice would 
diminish in force (or to illustrate with a different example, multiple personality 
syndrome is a social pretence that cannot survive the realization that it is merely our 
invention; see Griffiths 1997, 145-146). As Griffiths notes, these covert categories 
“are ontologically on a par with overt social constructions but are treated by the 
community as if they corresponded to independent distinctions in nature. They are 
treated in the same way as categories like chlorine or motor-neuron disease” 
(Griffiths 1997, 147). What makes covert social constructs powerful and at the same 
time seemingly paradoxical from a metalevel view is that individuals are appraising a 
syndrome as a passion, and thus are making “active” (enacted) judgments, yet for the 
practice to make a difference for that form of life it must be tacitly understood as a 
disclaimed action. 
As applied to Stoic views of affects, their normative prescription to affirm the 
apathetic affects looks to issue from a concealed separation between cultural-level 
and individual-level constructs. Firstly, the covert dimension concerns the 
characterization of pathological affects as out of our control—as disclaimed actions, 
once they are engaged (anger is the strongest of the pathological affects, and a 
                                                 
24
 Such “mutualism” appears to be broadly compatible with Stoic and Chinese views of affects. That is, 
for Stoics the mutualism regards, on the one hand, being affected by fate, and yet on the other hand 
choosing to affirm only the apathetic affects; and for Chinese views, on the one hand, being affected 
by social demands (for example, the demands of ritual propriety), and on the other hand acting with 
cultivated efficacy. 
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common target of Stoic writings; see Seneca’s De Ira, for example). Furthermore, the 
division made between pathe and apatheiai is not viewed merely as an interpretation; 
it is taken for granted within a wider normative, philosophical framework.  Stoicism 
aims to harness and channel human energies, which requires creating technologies of 
the self (Aurelius’s meditative exercises provide an instructive example). One must 
dwell in what the Stoic framework affords—the split between good and bad affects, 
learning the acceptance of fate, etc.—to then reap the benefits of this way of life. 
However, by adopting a metaview on the Stoic framework one can better glean that 
the pathological affects are characterizable as syndromes (socially constructed 
categories) whose features play an integral part of the Stoic way of life. 
 While the pathological affects are viewable as syndromes, this is not true of the 
good ones, since to do so would not fit with the Stoic “invention” of will (see Inwood 
2005). In other words, “will” (voluntas) is what allows for the Stoic’s affirmation of 
good affects, as well as a compatibilist rendering of self-determination juxtaposed 
with cosmic fate. What this reveals, I think, are predominantly western 
presuppositions that are philosophical at root; after all, what really justifies the 
separation between pathological affects and those that are under the domain of willed 
(non-syndromic) affects? If anything, the “gerrymandering” of affective territory 
reveals the socially constructed nature of Stoic therapeutics, whose various 
disciplined separations are part and parcel of Stoic harmonization and self-cultivation. 
 To recap the important disciplined separations: Stoics first divide affects into two 
types, claiming one is a disclaimed action while the other can be controlled. This split 
runs in tandem with the crucial piece of cognitive technology, the invention of will, as 
a way to render compatible assumptions about cosmic fate with the ability to control 
crucial elements of one’s being. These elements are then brought together in the 
affirmation of reason and the cultivation of judgment. From our metalevel view, 
pathe, apatheiai, will, reason, and judgment are instances of dynamically nominalistic 
social constructions. Furthermore, the constructivist claim that certain cultural affects 
are syndromes applies only to the Stoic characterization of pathological affects. 
Together these constructs induce “partitions” of the self, whereupon Stoic therapy 
offers a means to configure this territory.  In brief, what I think is revealed from our 
metaview is that Stoicism contains socially constructed dualities: fundamental 
assumptions within its project of self-cultivation that are at the same time 
unavoidably philosophical, and whose nature is not so easily discerned from within 
the Stoic framework itself. 
 
8.  COMPARING WORLDVIEWS: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER? 
 
Mary Tiles and Jinmei Yuan (2004) in similar fashion excavate some of the root 
differences in western and eastern worldviews. On the western side, there is a widely 
used tree metaphor (made systematic by Aristotle) that aims at classifications of 
genera and species—classifications utilizing a series of oppositions concerning what 
can be said of a thing, which in turn generate the tree’s branching structure. The 
epistemic tree metaphor relies on a philosophical outlook that contains a latent 
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dualism concerning the search for dyads that accord with this higher-order metaphor 
(underwritten it appears by a range of image schemas, basic metaphors, and so forth).  
By contrast, the multimodal channeling of the EQUILIBRIUM schema in Chinese 
philosophy accords with co-relational thinking, not merely the employment of dyads 
geared towards classification. As Tiles and Yuan write: “It is impossible to find a 
single fixed order by locating terms in a changing world.  Instead, to find countless 
relationships between counterparts [yin-yang] could be an effective way to describe 
the world” (Tiles and Yuan 2004, 143). Such co-relational thinking might be 
characterized as a thick dyadic mutualism, paralleling the difference between the one-
dimensional harnessing of the BALANCE schema and the harnessing of the richer 
multimodal EQUILIBRIUM schema. In their paper, Tiles and Yuan go on to argue for 
certain incommensurabilities between these worldviews, although they do not address 
whether there might also be deeply shared resources that nevertheless play central 
roles in generating these incommensurabilities. In this final section I speculatively 
explore the question: what is the nature of the incommensurabilities induced by the 
interactions between schemas, metaphors, and philosophical assumptions? 
With respect to philosophical assumptions, in comparison to Stoic views, on the 
Chinese model there is no love of fate, as Stoic fate presumes an underlying rational 
order of things. It also appears more generally that this presumption channels the 
widespread use of the western tree metaphor and the (epistemic) quest for a complete 
“tree of knowledge”. So here it would seem is a philosophical “seed” fed into a 
threefold interaction from which incommensurabilities emerge. Daoism by contrast 
doesn’t presume a hidden rational order; rather there is primarily inexhaustible 
creative flux, a philosophical assumption fed into another threefold interaction that 
generates a differing worldview.
25
 Such “inexhaustible creativity” draws forth 
perhaps the central difference between Stoicism and Daoism, as it highlights the 
reflective, interpenetrating nature of even the interaction itself. This is similar to 
Dewey’s notion of a reflex arc but more radical, as it is misleading to say that the 
threefold interaction “mirrors” or “reflects” the metaphysical “order” of creative flux.  
Allow me to clarify. 
In Stoicism there are certain bedrock notions that allow for firm reference, for 
example “Fate” as reason embodied in the cosmos, allowing us to grasp its nature and 
thus our relation to that nature. Furthermore, the fixed character of pathological 
affects serves as a bedrock philosophical category motivating the introduction of will 
and the role of judgment in affirming the apathetic affects, which are crucial 
ingredients in forming our dispositions, on which the Stoics place so much emphasis. 
So while Stoicism ends up with notions resonant with Daoism such as harmonization 
and the importance of “balancing,” the paths are quite different due to their overall 
differing worldviews. The latent dualities present in Stoicism lead to the use of light 
metaphors that highlight harmonizing one’s capacity to reason with a larger rational 
                                                 
25
 While Dao is also characterized as constant, it is the interpenetration of being and non-being—Dao’s 
creative originary aspect—that is highlighted here, which also accords with not reifying shi-fei 
distinctions (see, for example, Zhuang-Zi chapter 2). 
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order, as well as metaphors that, because of these dualities, present the path of 
cultivation as a struggle between opposing forces, where choice is required to have 
any hope of achieving liberation. Light is separated from “dark” (pathological affects, 
not following reason, and so forth), where achieving cosmic harmonization is set in 
opposition to these other forces. 
For Stoicism and Chinese philosophy, the (differential) threefold interactions of 
image schemas, metaphors, and background assumptions induce overall philosophical 
worldviews geared towards self-cultivation. The Stoic technologies of the self—for 
example, Aurelius’ daily meditations; the use of, and training in, Stoic logic; learning 
to attune one’s attention; and so forth—are grounded in these interactions, which 
while process oriented (aiming as they do at forging proper dispositions) hide 
dualities that are fundamentally different from Daoist views. For the threefold 
interaction in Daoist strains of Chinese philosophy tends to erode any duality, 
embracing the interpenetrating nature of oppositions (e.g., Dao-De-Jing chapters 16, 
22, and 42; Zhuang-Zi chapters 12 and 27).  What this means for our metalevel 
discussion is that even the interaction cannot be separated from cosmic, co-relational 
flux.
26
 Light is thus not cleaved from dark; “will,” to the extent that any similar but 
ultimately incommensurable notion exists (compare Bruya 2010), is not generated by 
an opposition to pathological affects; judgment is not a faculty; and so forth. More 
generally, western categories that partition “mind” into things like reason, belief, 
desire, will, emotion, and so forth are separations incommensurable with Chinese 
worldviews that do not share the same root assumptions.
27
 
Daoism does not attempt to put Humpty-Dumpty back together, as it were, which 
Stoicism (and the western tradition more generally) does, since there is not any such 
problem to start with; heart and mind are already integrated from the start. Daoist 
“technologies” of self-cultivation harness potentialities that in a sense are already 
there, yet at the same time require appropriate channeling to awaken us to our original 
naturalness. In sum, the interaction of image schemas, metaphors, and background 
philosophical (mainly Daoist) assumptions enacts a way of being that redounds (and 
perhaps “resounds,” but not, from a western view, “mirrors”) to what this very 
interaction, this overall worldview, is gesturing towards, namely an inexhaustible 
cosmic affectivity. This is not an affectivity that re-flects, re-presents, or aims to re-
integrate forms of experience within a larger cosmos; for there is no initial split 
between, say, pathological affects and good ones. Western ways of thinking are 
inclined to raise questions like: What is an affect (perhaps for epistemic purposes of 
classification)? What are the relata of an affective relation?  What is the contrast class 
of affects? But such questions themselves reveal western presuppositions about 
western ways of conceiving. These sorts of questions are not germane in a Daoist 
                                                 
26
 Such “self-reflective” interpenetration I think also coheres with Daoist deployments of “goblet 
words” and paradoxical expressions. 
27
 To reemphasize, even though there may be universally employed image schemas (basic metaphors, 
etc.), differences emerge from the interaction of image schemas, metaphors, and background 
assumptions. The incommensurabilities between worldviews emerge most prominently in how affects 
are conceived—one invoking disciplined separations, and the other emptying-out any such separations. 
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context, as these questions contain the encrustations of modes of thinking that 
Daoism would aim to dissolve.
28
 
One might conjecture that the “emptied” nature of Daoist affectivity is the 
creative Dao itself, making ineffectual the question “what are Daoist affects?” For 
such a question conjures a gap between an account of affects and what that account 
signifies.  As Hans-Georg Moeller writes: 
 
Ancient Chinese philosophy in general, and Daoist thought in particular, does not tend to 
suppose an “ontological” gap between the realms of representation and presence. An 
ancient Chinese “semiotics of presence” rather conceives of both the signifier and the 
signified as equally present. …The Daoist ineffable, the Dao, is…the nonpresent pivot 
around which everything that is present revolves. It is that central element in the world 
that is empty of both name and form (Moeller 2004, 145). 
 
Thus it would seem that the question “what are Daoist affects?” is empty in answer 
and form precisely because Daoism, in emptying out such a question and its 
presuppositions, is gesturing back to an embodied cosmic presencing, where Daoist 
affectivity is the very “pivot” alluded to. If this is the case, it only indicates just how 
radically different these worldviews are.
29
 In other words, the insufficiency of 
western frameworks, even constructivism, to capture the “bottomless mutuality” of 
such affectivity is a limit brought forth by the very presuppositions (predominantly 
western) that enable these ways of seeing. The “light” that these similar yet ultimately 
incommensurable worldviews shed on self-cultivation is in the end quite different, as 
the worldviews conceal differences that it appears are unavoidably and inseparably 
philosophical at root. Finally, if these speculative remarks are on the right track, it 
would seem that what this paper’s triadic approach signifies is neither universality nor 
difference as such, but rather the emergent features of differences-via-universals, 
some features of which efface themselves in the process of being brought into view. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 Thus while (sagely) knowing-how is good, knowing-that is not (Dao-De-Jing chapter 48; Zhuang-Zi 
chapters 2 and 23). 
29
 The nature of the incommensurabilities also realigns the traditional contrast between (western) 
analytic modes of proceeding and (“Chinese”) holistic modes of being (compare Hansen 2000).  I 
suggest, but shall not argue for the claim, that the incommensurabilities are best viewed as products of 
semiosis, where a Daoist “semiotics of presence” would differ from, say, a Mohist “semiotics” of 
analysis because of their differential threefold interactions (whose emergent contrasts would be 
brought into relief due to these interactive dynamics). Such incommensurabilities can be 
conceptualized metaphorically as distinct complexes in a semiotic landscape; the truly radical claim 
would lie in what a Daoist semiotics of presence signifies, as it apparently would empty out even this 
meta-level metaphoric image. Note that this image also accommodates various commensurabilities 
(“overlapping complexes”) between eastern and western views (as well as within these respective 
traditions). My selective approach has focused only on certain incommensurate “peaks of interest,” as 
it were, and is certainly not intended to be representative of ancient Chinese philosophy in general. 
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